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Abstract 
Using matched student-teacher panel data from the state of Florida, we study the determinants of 
teacher job change and the impact of such mobility on the distribution of teacher quality. We 
find that the quality of teachers who exit teaching is bimodal with peer teacher characteristics 
playing an important role. Teachers who rank above their faculty colleagues are more mobile. 
Additionally, as the share of peer teachers with more experience, advanced degrees or 
professional certification increase, the likelihood of moving within district decreases. We also 
find evidence of assortative matching among teachers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
*We wish to thank the staff of the Florida Department of Education's K-20 Education Data Warehouse for their 
assistance in obtaining and interpreting the data used in this study.  We also gratefully acknowledge the National 
Center for the Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Education Research (CALDER) funded through Grant 
R305A060018 to the Urban Institute from the Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education for 
supporting this research. This paper has benefited from comments from Thomas Dee, seminar participants at the 
New York University, and conference participants at the American Education Finance Association, the American 
Educational Research Association, and at the 4th Annual CALDER Conference. The views expressed is this paper 
are solely our own and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Florida Department of Education or our funders.   
2 
 
I. Introduction 
Given the central role of teacher quality in determining student achievement,1 there is 
growing concern over the impact of teacher job change on both the overall level of teacher 
quality and the distribution of teacher quality across schools.  In particular, do the best teachers 
leave teaching and does teacher mobility within the profession exacerbate differences in 
educational quality across schools?  The answers to these questions have important implications 
for designing policies to promote student achievement and reduce achievement gaps across 
students from different racial, ethnic and economic backgrounds.  
The effects of teacher labor market decisions on teacher quality and student achievement 
are ambiguous, a priori.  If high quality teachers possess transferable skills which are valued in 
other occupations, attrition will tend to erode average teacher quality.  However, attrition may 
have a positive effect on the average quality of teachers if relatively less-effective teachers 
receive little job satisfaction, voluntarily leave the profession and are replaced by more able 
teachers.  Likewise, the effect of teacher movement between schools on the distribution of 
teacher quality across schools is not clear ex-ante.  Inter-school mobility of teachers could 
exacerbate the divergence in education quality across schools if schools serving disadvantaged 
populations lose their best teachers to schools serving more advantaged students.  However, it is 
also possible that switching of schools by teachers has no effect on the distribution of teacher 
quality across schools and simply enhances the utility of the teachers that move. 
 A number of previous studies have explored the relationship between various observable 
teacher qualifications, including college entrance exam scores, performance on teacher 
certification exams and possession of advanced degrees on teacher attrition (Boyd, et al. (2005), 
Feng (2009), Feng (2011), Imazeki (2005), Podgursky, et al. (2004)).  However, studies of 
student achievement find little correlation between these credentials and the impact of teachers 
on student test scores, particularly in elementary and middle school (Betts, et al. (2003), 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007), Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2010), Hanushek et al. (2005), 
Harris and Sass (2011), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger (2008)). 
                                                            
1 See recent work by Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007), Hanushek, et al. (2005), Kane, Rockoff and Staiger 
(2008), Rockoff (2004) and Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005) which demonstrate that teacher quality is the most 
important schooling input in the determination of student achievement. 
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Previous research has highlighted the disparity in qualifications of teachers in schools 
serving primarily disadvantaged and minority students versus teachers in schools with more 
advantaged student bodies (Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2005), Goldhaber, Choi and Cramer 
(2007), Lankford, et al. (2002)).  There is also circumstantial evidence that within-profession 
teacher mobility is contributing to these differences in teacher credentials.  Teachers in schools 
serving primarily disadvantaged students are more likely to transfer to a new school district 
(Hanushek, et al. (2004), Imazeki (2005), Ingersoll (2001)) and teachers in urban inner-city 
schools are more likely to migrate away from their schools than teachers in other areas (Ingersoll 
(2001), Lankford, et al. (2002)).  Similarly, teachers, particularly white teachers, tend to move 
away from schools with high percentages of minority students ((Boyd et al. (2005), Feng (2009), 
Feng (2010), Feng (2011), Hanushek et al. (2004), Imazeki (2005), Scafidi, Sjoquist and 
Stinebrickner (2007)).   
Given the generally weak relationship between observable teacher characteristics and 
student achievement, three recent studies have attempted to directly investigate the relationship 
between teacher job choice and a teacher’s contribution to student achievement or teacher 
“value-added.”  Kreig (2006) analyzes the relationship between teacher attrition and teacher 
value-added in Washington State while Boyd, et al. (2007) and Goldhaber, Gross and Player 
(2007) analyze both attrition and inter-school mobility in New York City and in North Carolina 
respectively. These papers generally conclude high quality teachers are less likely to transfer and 
leave.  
In this paper we consider the impact of teacher quality, measured by teacher value-added, 
on both teacher movement into other occupations and mobility across schools in Florida. We 
derive multiple value-added measures of teacher quality and investigate how each is related to 
individual teacher choices of exit from teaching and movement across schools. Building on 
recent work which highlights the importance of teacher peer effects (Jackson and Bruegmann 
(2009), Jackson (2010)), we also explore how the average quality of faculty colleagues and the 
productivity of a teacher relative to her peer teachers affect teacher job choice.  Further, we 
consider the faculty and student characteristics of schools teachers move to and the implications 
for the distribution of teacher quality across schools. 
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II.  Institutional Background 
Public schools in Florida are organized into 67 countywide school districts, ranging in 
size from Miami-Dade, with 350,000 students to Jefferson County with just over 1,000 students 
in pre-K through 12 (Florida Department of Education (2011)).  While new teachers tend to 
obtain their first job near where they went to school, initial placements are spread throughout the 
state, with many working far from the location of their preparation program (Mihaly et al. 
(2012)).  New teachers exhibit a high degree of mobility with 60 percent of teachers leaving their 
initial school placement within four years and only one-fourth of new teachers remaining in their 
initial school placement after 6 years (Feng (2009)).  Perhaps due to the relatively large 
geographic size of districts in Florida, inter-district transfers make up a relatively small 
proportion of teacher transfers; only about 1 in 10 new teachers leave their first placement to 
teach in a different district in the first four years of their career.  In contrast, about 30 percent 
transfer to another school in the same district within four years and about one-third leave the 
public school system altogether. 
Among the 67 countywide school districts in Florida, all but one have collective 
bargaining agreements that govern personnel matters, including transfer rights.  District 
collective bargaining agreements vary in the restrictiveness of the contract with respect to 
voluntary transfers, involuntary transfers and reduction-in-force provisions.  They also differ in 
the seniority provisions regarding each type of job action.  Voluntary transfer provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements establish the criteria for selecting among candidates for open 
positions.  In some districts transfer positions do not mention seniority, in others it is one among 
many criteria and in still others seniority takes priority over all other criteria (Feng, Cohen-Vogel 
and Osborne-Lampkin (2009)).  Frequently current teachers have preference over new hires.  
The preference may be as weak as simply giving advance notification of open positions or as 
strong as requiring district employees be placed into open positions before any new teacher is 
hired.2      
 
                                                            
2 In future work we plan to include district fixed effects to account for the differences in collective bargaining 
provisions across districts in Florida. 
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III.  Methods 
A. Measuring Teacher Quality 
In order to gauge teacher quality we construct twelve value-added measures of teacher 
productivity (six each for math and reading).  All of the measures are derived from the following 
student achievement model: 
itktimtijmtititit AA    SβPβXβ 3211  (1) 
Ait is the achievement level of student i in year t, where achievement is measured by the 
student’s scale score on the FCAT-NRT (Stanford Achievement Test), normalized by grade and 
year.  The vector Xit represents time varying student/family inputs, which include student 
mobility within and between school years.  Classroom peer characteristics are represented by the 
vector P-ijmt where the subscript –i denotes students other than individual i in classroom j in 
school m.  These peer characteristics include class size, the fraction of classroom peers who are 
female, fraction of classroom peers who are black, average age (in months) of classroom peers, 
and the fraction of classroom peers who changed schools.  The school-level input vector, Smt, 
includes the administrative experience of the principal, the principal’s administrative experience 
squared, whether the teacher is new to the school and whether the school is in its first year of 
operation.  Time-invariant student/family characteristics are represented by i .  Unobserved 
teacher characteristics are captured by a year-specific teacher effect, kt . it  is a mean zero 
random error.  The teacher effect, which we use to measure teacher quality, represents a teacher’s 
contribution to student achievement, net of prior educational inputs and contemporaneous 
student, peer and school influences. Given the student test scores are normalized, the teacher 
effects are calibrated in standard deviation units. 
The six teacher quality measures for each subject vary according to the assumed 
persistence of educational inputs (  ), the method for capturing time-invariant student 
heterogeneity ( i ) and whether or not teacher effects are measured separately by year or 
assumed to be constant across all years (i.e. kt = k  for all t).  The first measure of teacher 
quality, which we denote Q1, assumes complete persistence (  =1), uses observable student 
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characteristics3 to control for time-constant student heterogeneity, and allows for separate teacher 
effects by year.  The second teacher quality measure, Q2, is the same as Q1 except the 
persistence of educational inputs is no longer constrained to equal one.  Teacher quality measure 
Q3 is the same as Q1, but employs student fixed effects, rather than observable student 
covariates to capture both observed and unobserved time-invariant student heterogeneity.  
Measures Q4, Q5 and Q6 correspond to Q1, Q2 and Q3, except that the teacher effect is assumed 
to be constant across all years, rather than varying by year.  While time-invariant measures Q4-
Q6 will mask any changes in true teacher performance, they are less subject to variation due to 
measurement error in individual student tests scores.  As such, they are likely to provide a less 
“noisy” signal of teacher quality (McCaffrey, et al. (2009)). 
The teacher effect estimates are re-centered to have a mean value of zero in each school 
level (elementary, middle, high) for measures Q4, Q5 and Q6 and within each school level in 
each year for measures Q1, Q2 and Q3.  Since there are no school fixed effects in the 
achievement model, the estimates represent the teacher’s effect on student achievement relative 
to the average teacher in the state at the same school level. 
B. Estimating the Determinants of Teacher Job Choice 
We model a teacher’s decision about job quits or job change as an individual utility 
maximizing problem over a number of job choices.4  A teacher will select among a group of jobs 
based on her individual preferences and the characteristics of the job, including both pecuniary 
aspects and non-pecuniary components. A teacher will compare the available options and select 
the job that yields the highest present value of expected utility.  
The decision facing a teacher during each time period t is represented by: 
MaxሾPVሺUୱ, U୵, U୆, U୐ሻ	where	U ൌ fሺ۲୩୫୰୲	, Q୩୫୰୲	, R୩୫୰୲	, ۴ି୩୫୰୲ሻ (2) 
Where the subscript kmrt indicates teacher k in school m and district r at time t. The first term, 
Dkmrt, represents a vector of control variables that have been shown in the literature to be 
                                                            
3 These include gender, race/ethnicity, free/reduced-price lunch eligibility, gifted program participation, limited 
English program participation, and a set of indicators for types of student disabilities. 
4 This is the traditional approach that has been employed in the analysis of teacher labor markets.  However, a recent 
paper by Boyd, et al. (forthcoming) employs an alternative approach based on a two-sided matching model.  We 
intend to explore this two-sided approach in future work. 
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important in influencing a teacher’s mobility decision. These include teacher demographics and 
professional credentials as well as classroom, school, and district characteristics. A teacher’s 
race, gender and age are included to account for teacher preferences. Interactions between age 
and gender are included to account for women’s reproductive decisions.5  A teacher’s experience 
and education level, professional certification status, and subject specific certification are all 
included to reflect human capital investment. A set of subject-area indicators allows for 
differences in teaching difficulty and outside opportunities. Teacher’s salaries are included to 
account for the monetary rewards from teaching. 6  The effects of non-monetary working 
conditions are captured by a variety of classroom, school, and district characteristics such as 
class size, average student math scores, disciplinary incidents, student racial/ethnic composition, 
and percent of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch (a proxy for family income).  As is 
standard in discrete time hazard models, the natural log of time (the number of years a teacher 
has been teaching at their current school) is also included as an explanatory variable. 
Qkmrt is an indicator of teacher quality or effectiveness, captured by one of the teacher 
quality measures, Q1-Q6, described above. The value-added teacher quality measures capture a 
variety of unobserved teacher characteristics that impact teacher productivity and hence labor 
market decisions, including innate ability, non-cognitive skills and pre-service (undergraduate) 
training. The quality parameter may also proxy intrinsic psychological rewards from teaching. 
Campus peer faculty characteristics are represented by F-kmrt, where the subscript –k 
denotes teachers other than teacher k in school m. These teacher peer characteristics include 
value-added peer teacher quality measures and peer teacher credentials, such as teaching 
experience, advanced degree attainment, National Board certification, and professional (non-
temporary) state certification.  We also include measures of the percent of peers with 
certification in specific subject areas to allow for different types of peer human capital to have 
unequal impacts on the mobility of individual teachers.  In addition to the absolute level of peer 
teacher quality, we include Rkmrt, which is an indicator of the quality ranking of a specific teacher 
within their school. This allows us to test whether relative performance influences a teacher’s 
mobility choices.  
                                                            
5Commuting time to school is possibly an important aspect of teachers’ employment choice. Unfortunately, the 
available data do not provide such information. 
6In particular, we employ annual base teaching salary, excluding bonuses, as our measure of teacher compensation. 
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A teacher maximizes his utility by selecting the option that provides the highest utility 
out of four possibilities: stay at the present school (S), move to a different school within the 
school district (W), move between districts to a new school in a different school district (B), and 
leave teaching (L). It is thus assumed that all moves are the results of utility-maximizing choices.  
While this assumption may not be correct in cases of involuntary separation due to poor 
performance or workforce reduction, such cases are relatively rare.  According to teacher exit 
interviews conducted by the Florida Department of Education, 85 to 90 percent of teachers exit 
voluntarily.  Including involuntary separations in the estimation would tend to bias against 
finding significant results since involuntary separations are primarily unrelated to pay and 
working conditions. 
For teachers, most moves and exits occur at the end of the school year.  In addition, 
information on schools and districts is typically only available at yearly intervals.  Given this 
discreteness in the data, we employ a discrete multinomial logit hazard model with both time-
varying and time-invariant coefficients. The discrete-time hazard function models the probability 
that any of the four events—staying, moving within the district, moving between districts, or 
leaving—happens to teacher k during period t+1, which is conditional on the event not occurring 
until that time.  The discrete-time hazard function can be interpreted as the probability of 
transition at discrete time t+1 given survival up to time t+1:  
݄௞௠௥,௧ାଵ ൌ Prൣ ௞ܶ௠௥,௧ାଵ ൌ ݐ ൅ 1ห ௞ܶ௠௥,௧ାଵ ൐ ݐ ൅ 1, ܦ௞௠௥௧	, ܳ௞௠௥௧	, ܴ௞௠௥௧	, ିܨ ௞௠௥௧൧ (3) 
Assuming independence of irrelevant alternatives and error terms that are independently 
and identically extreme value distributed, a multinomial logit hazard model specifies the 
probability of choosing each alternative as a function of teacher, school, and district 
characteristics. The cumulative probability of leaving a particular school is a summation of the 
transition probability of exiting teaching, the probability of moving within a district and the 
probability of moving across districts: 
Logit ቀ݄௞௠௥,௧ାଵሺܹሻቁ ൌ 	ߙௐ ൅ ߚௐଵ ∗ ܦ௞௠௥௧ ൅ ߚௐଶ	 ∗ ܳ௞௠௥௧ 		൅ ߚௐଷ	 ∗ ܴ௞௠௥௧ 	൅	ߚௐସ ∗ ିܨ ௞௠௥௧(4A) 
Logit ቀ݄௞௠௥,௧ାଵሺܤሻቁ ൌ 	ߙ஻ ൅ ߚ஻ଵ ∗ ܦ௞௠௥௧ ൅ ߚ஻ଶ	 ∗ ܳ௞௠௥௧ 		൅ ߚ஻ଷ	 ∗ ܴ௞௠௥௧ 	൅	ߚ஻ସ ∗ ିܨ ௞௠௥௧ (4B) 
Logit ቀ݄௞௠௥,௧ାଵሺܮሻቁ ൌ 	ߙ௅ ൅ ߚ௅ଵ ∗ ܦ௞௠௥௧ ൅ ߚ௅ଶ	 ∗ ܳ௞௠௥௧ 		൅ ߚ௅ଷ	 ∗ ܴ௞௠௥௧ 	൅	ߚ௅ସ ∗ ିܨ ௞௠௥௧ (4C) 
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Estimates are reported as exponentiated coefficients or odds ratios. An odds ratio greater 
than one indicates that a one-unit increase in the predictor is associated with an increased 
probability of moving or leaving compared with the default of staying at the initial school. 
Likewise, an odds ratio of less than one implies a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable is 
associated with a decreased probability of leaving or moving. 
The coefficients of primary interest are ߚଶ , ߚଷ	and ߚସ . The values of ߚ௪ଶ , ߚ஻ଶ  and 
ߚ௅ଶ	will depend in part on the degree to which human capital traits that are associated with 
productivity in teaching are transferable across schools and occupations.  For example, Harris 
and Sass (2010) find that teacher value-added in math is positively correlated with a teacher’s 
intelligence and subject knowledge (as rated by their principal).  Likewise, the enthusiasm and 
motivation of reading teachers is positively associated with their value-added.  If such cognitive 
and non-cognitive traits also have value in occupations other than teaching, then ߚ௅ଶ	will have a 
value greater than one, indicating that high quality teachers are more likely to exit public school 
teaching than are teachers of average quality. If, however, the traits of highly effective teachers 
are not transferable across occupations, the value of ߚ௅ଶ	may be indistinguishable from zero.  
Presumably productive traits of teachers would be more likely to be transferable across schools 
within the public education sector, making the values of ߚ௪ଶ	 and ߚ஻ଶ   greater than ߚ௅ଶ .  
However, if the skills that make a teacher productive are not easily observable by persons outside 
of the teacher’s current school the odds ratios ߚ௪ଶ and ߚ஻ଶ may still be close to one, indicating 
teaching quality has little or no effect on mobility between public schools.  
In addition to absolute teacher quality, the productivity of a teacher relative to her current 
colleagues may influence teacher job choice, though the direction of the effect is unclear.  
Podgursky, et al. (2004) find that the probability of female teachers exiting the teaching 
profession increases the greater the difference between their own ACT college entrance-exam 
score and the average of the ACT scores of other teachers at their school.  This may reflect 
positive assortative matching whereby teachers seek out positions in which their productivity 
matches the productivity of their colleagues.7  In addition, relative peer quality could affect 
teacher mobility choice if positive spillover effects exist whereby more capable peers stimulate 
                                                            
7Note that our teacher quality measures are not conditional on experience, so an inexperienced teacher could have 
experienced colleagues who are unconditionally more productive than the new teacher, but who would be less 
productive conditional on experience. 
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productivity via informal learning channels (Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), Sass, et al. (2010)). 
Alternatively, if one’s self perception is a function of the productivity of their colleagues, 
relatively less productive teachers might opt to move to schools where they would be surrounded 
by less able colleagues. In this case the odds ratio of ߚ௪ସ would be less than one, i.e., teachers 
with higher quality peers are more likely to switch schools.  Relative rank within a school may 
also be used as a signal of absolute productivity by potential employers at other schools (e.g. 
Mrs. Smith was teacher of the year at school X, therefore she must be good).  This would yield 
an odds ratio greater than one. 
IV. Data 
We utilize data from the Florida Education Data Warehouse (FL-EDW), an integrated 
longitudinal database that covers all public school students and teachers in the state of Florida.8  
Like statewide administrative databases in North Carolina and Texas, the FL-EDW contains a 
rich set of information on both individual students and their teachers which is linked through 
time.  Since students may have more than one instructor in a given subject at a point in time (e.g. 
a regular education teacher and a special education reading teacher in elementary school or two 
math classes taught by different instructors in high school), we limit the analysis to students with 
a single “solely responsible” teacher in a subject and year. 
Statewide data, as opposed to data from an individual school district, are particularly 
useful for studying teacher labor markets since we can follow teachers who move from one 
district to another within Florida.  We cannot, however, track teachers who move to another 
state. Fortunately, because Florida is a peninsula surrounded on three sides by water, interstate 
emigration of teachers from Florida is relatively infrequent.  Using the nationally representative 
School and Staffing Survey, Feng (2010) concludes that misclassifications of the three types of 
movers (i.e., inter-state movers, movers to private school within same state, and movers to 
private schools in other states) are not a major concern in geographically large states like Florida.  
The available data cover school years 1995/1996 through 2004/2005.  However, testing 
of math and reading achievement in consecutive grades did not begin until the 1999/2000 school 
year and only includes grades 3-10.  Construction of our teacher quality measures is based on 
                                                            
8 Detailed descriptions of the Florida data are provided in Sass (2006) and Harris and Sass (2011). 
11 
 
current and prior-year student achievement, thereby limiting our sample to the school years 
2000/2001 through 2004/2005 for math and reading teachers in grades 4-10. Teacher mobility 
status for year t is based on job information in year t+1. Therefore, our analysis of teacher quality 
and mobility is limited to the school years 2000/01 through 2003/04. 
V. Results 
A.  Descriptive Evidence 
Table 1 shows the correlation among teacher quality indicators for both math and 
reading.9  Within-subject correlation is fairly strong for both math and reading. For example, the 
correlation between teacher-by-year estimates assuming complete persistence and those with 
partial persistence (Q1 and Q2) is 0.80 for both math and reading. However, when student fixed 
effects are used in place of observed student characteristics to control for time-invariant student 
heterogeneity (Q3 versus Q2) the correlations are lower (0.57 in math and 0.51 in reading).  
When we compare teacher-by-year estimates (Q1, Q2 and Q3) with the corresponding all-year 
teacher effects the correlations are relatively strong, ranging from 0.63 to 0.71 in math and 0.61 
to 0.74 in reading.  Thus while there is no consensus on the specification of value-added models, 
the selection of a particular value-added model should not radically alter our estimates of the 
effect of teacher quality on teacher labor market decisions. 
Since there is subject specialization by teachers in middle and high school, the cross-
subject correlations almost universally represent elementary school teachers who teach all 
subjects in a self-contained classroom.  Interestingly, these teacher effect correlations are more 
modest than the cross-model correlations within subject, ranging from 0.20 to 0.49.  This 
suggests that teaching ability can vary across subject matter and that the estimated impacts of 
teacher quality on teacher mobility could differ between math and reading. 
Table 2 provides means and standard errors of the 12 teacher-quality-by-subject measures 
for each of the teacher mobility categories: stayers, intra-district movers, inter-district movers 
and leavers. Across subject and quality measures, the average quality of teachers who stay at the 
initial school is statistically higher than that of other teachers.  While the average quality of inter-
                                                            
9 For a more detailed analysis of alternative value-added models and the degree to which they produce similar 
estimates of teacher value-added, see Harris, Sass and Semykina (2010). 
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district movers is generally lower than that of intra-district movers and leavers, the differences 
are small. The differences in average quality between intra-district movers and leavers are also 
small and show no readily discernible pattern. 
B.  Multivariate Estimates of Absolute Teacher Quality and Teacher Mobility 
Table 3 presents a series of estimates of the multinomial logit hazard model, which 
controls for factors besides teacher quality that may affect teacher job choice. Each row of the 
table represents estimates from a separate regression that employs a particular teacher quality 
measure. All statistically significant odds ratios are less than one, indicating that in general, the 
likelihood a teacher stays in the current school assignment increases with teacher quality. 
For the models based on separate teacher-by-year quality estimates (Q1-Q3), the results 
indicate there is a consistent negative relationship between teacher quality and the probability of 
exit from the teaching profession (holding other factors constant).  In five of six equations the 
odds ratio on the quality indicator is statistically significant and less than one.  In models which 
assume teacher quality is constant over time (Q4-Q6), the estimated odds ratios are also always 
less than one, though are statistically significant in only three of six cases.  Whether time-
invariant or time-varying teacher quality measures are used the estimated effects are 
quantitatively substantial.  For example, the model where the computation of teacher quality is 
based on complete persistence of inputs, student fixed effects, and time-invariant teacher quality 
in math (Q6-math) yields an odds ratio on teacher quality of 0.837.  This indicates that a teacher 
who boosts student achievement by one standard deviation more than the average teacher would 
have a 16.3 percent (1 - 0.837) lower probability of exit. Overall the effect of a one-standard –
deviation-unit increase in teacher quality on the likelihood of exit ranges from 3.0 to 20.7 
percent.  
Compared to leavers, results for the relationship between teacher quality and intra-district 
moves are less robust.  The odds ratios are always less than one, indicating a negative 
relationship between teacher quality and the likelihood of making a within-district move.  
However, the relationship is only statistically significant in half the cases (two out of four in 
math and four out of six in reading). 
Consistent with expectations, the quality/mobility relationship is weakest for inter-district 
moves.  Given Florida has county-wide school districts, taking a job in a different district 
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typically involves changing residential locations.  Most likely residential change is affected by 
external factors like spousal job change or the desire to move closer to other family members.  
We find that a significant relationship between inter-district moves and teacher quality in only 
two of six math specifications and in none of the six reading specifications. 
The estimates presented in Table 3 are based on models that assume a monotonic 
relationship between teacher quality and teacher job choice.  However, as discussed above, there 
are reasons for expecting otherwise.  For example, assortative matching could lead both 
relatively high and low-quality teachers to change schools.  Further, both higher and lower-
quality teachers may be more likely to leave teaching than the average quality teacher, but for 
different reasons.  High quality teachers may be more likely to exit because they have 
particularly good outside opportunities whereas low quality teachers exit because they recognize 
they are not particularly effective teachers or do not enjoy teaching. 
To account for the different departure trends for teachers of different quality, we divide 
teachers into four quality quartiles and estimate the relationship between a teacher’s quality 
quartile and the odds of staying, moving and exiting. Estimates of the multinomial hazard are 
presented in Table 4 (quartile 1 is the reference category).  With the time-invariant teacher 
quality measures, a clear bimodal pattern emerges for the relationship between teacher quality 
and exit.  For all three measures and both subjects, teachers in the middle two quartiles have 
much lower exit probabilities than do teachers in the bottom and top quartiles.  The odds ratios 
for the second and third quartiles are around 0.7 to 0.8 and statistically significant, indicating that 
teachers in the middle 50 percent of the quality distribution are 20 to 30 percentage points less 
likely to leave teaching than are teachers in the lowest quartile of the quality distribution.  Odds 
ratios for the highest quartile teachers are typically in the range of 0.9-1.0, indicating that they 
are only slightly less likely to exit than are bottom-quartile teachers and are much more likely to 
leave teaching than teachers in the middle of the quality distribution. In contrast, the pattern of 
results is less clear for the single-year quality estimates (Q1-Q3).  The odds ratios are generally 
close to one and do not differ much between quartiles. 
The bimodal relationship between teacher quality and exit does not carry over to 
decisions to switch schools.  Consistent with the results in Table 3, we find that in seven of 
twelve cases top quartile teachers are less likely to change schools within a district than are their 
colleagues in the bottom quartile.   There is no consistent pattern for inter-district moves. 
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C.  Estimates of Peer Teacher Quality and Teacher Mobility 
Table 5 displays estimates from five separate multinomial logit hazard models.  All 
employ the teacher quality estimate derived from the math achievement model with complete 
persistence, student fixed effects and time-invariant teacher quality (Q6-math). Results from the 
other eleven teacher quality indicators are not presented to conserve space, but are available by 
request.  We discuss below any qualitative differences in results between the models using the 
Q6-math quality metric and models using the other eleven quality measures. 
Models 1 and 2 consider peer quality in absolute terms.  In model 1 peer teacher quality 
effects are linear in means whereas model 2 allows for non-linear peer teacher effects. Using 
either the continuous peer teacher quality or peer quality quartiles, we do not find any consistent 
patterns of peer teacher quality on either inter-school mobility or exit from teaching. 
Using model 3 we investigate whether one’s quality standing within a school influences 
the decision to move or leave.  Rank is in reverse order where the worst teacher is ranked as 1, 
next worst teacher 2, and so on. Controlling for the total number of faculty at a school, we find a 
statistically significant positive relationship between a teacher’s quality ranking within their 
current school and the likelihood of moving.  Specifically, better ranked teachers are more likely 
to move to other schools within a school district and exit public schools.10 
In model 4 we examine whether observable teacher peer characteristics influence 
individual teachers’ mobility decisions. We find that having more experienced peers and higher 
percentages of colleagues with a masters degree or professional (non-temporary) certification 
translates into a lower likelihood of transferring within district. This result is robust across all 
twelve measures of teacher quality. This suggests that peer teachers with better qualifications 
may be more likely to provide positive spillovers or otherwise enhance the work environment. 
Having more professionally certified colleagues is also associated with a lower smaller 
likelihood of exiting the teaching profession. Curiously, increases in the shares of colleagues 
who hold masters degrees or are National Board certified are associated with a greater likelihood 
of exiting public school system. 
                                                            
10 While the odds ratio for teacher quality in the exit equation is not statistically significant using the Q6-math 
measure.  However, for all six reading teacher quality measures as well as math teacher quality measures Q4 and Q5 
the odds ratio is statistically significant. 
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Our final model of teacher job choice combines all variables of interest into a single 
specification. The likelihood of an intra-district move decreases uniformly with teacher quality.  
The relationship between teacher quality and exit continues to be bimodal; both top-quartile and 
bottom-quartile teachers are less likely to exit public school that are teachers in the middle two 
quality quartiles.  Holding constant own-teacher quality, having more bottom quartile colleagues 
is associated with a lower likelihood of intra-district mobility. However, holding constant own 
and peer teacher quality, the higher the relative rank of a teacher the more likely she is to move 
between schools in a district. Having more professional certified colleagues with both advanced 
degree and job-specific teaching experience translates into a lower likelihood of intra-district 
transfer. Additionally, having more colleagues with professional certification in high school 
math is also associated with lower intra-district turnover. In contrast, more peers with advanced 
degrees and national board certification are associated with higher exit rates. 
D.  Mobility and the Distribution of Teacher Quality 
To understand the implications of teacher mobility on the distribution of teacher quality 
across schools we first compare the mean characteristics of the origin and destination schools for 
teachers who switch schools.  The averages and t-statistics for the differences in means are 
presented in Table 6.  Consistent with prior research, teachers tend to move to schools where 
students have higher achievement, a smaller fraction of students are black and a smaller 
proportion from low-income families.  In contrast, we do not find a consistent pattern in the 
relationship between average teacher quality at the sending and receiving schools. The results 
vary depending on the measure of teacher quality we employ and in general the differences are 
quite small. For intra-district movers, they generally move to schools with higher student test 
scores, as reflected by a better school grade.11 However, the comparison of school averages can 
be deceptive if the teachers fleeing low-quality schools are better than the average of the 
colleagues they leave behind. 
In Table 7 we compare the quality of a teacher making a move and the quality of faculty 
at the receiving school. Since we examine the average faculty quality prior to the move, we are 
avoiding any confounding caused by incoming teachers changing the average quality of teachers 
                                                            
11 In Florida, schools are assigned letter grades based on student performance on standardized exams.  See Florida 
Department of Education (2010) and Feng, Figlio and Sass (2010). 
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on campus. The restricted student fixed effects based teacher-by-year value-added in math (Q6-
math) is used as the metric of teacher quality and the distribution of teacher quality is broken up 
into four quartiles.  Looking down the diagonal, it is apparent that the pluralities of movers into 
each of the four receiving-school quality categories are of comparable quality to the average 
quality of faculty at the receiving school.  Looking across rows it is also evident that the fraction 
of movers goes down with the difference in the quality of the moving teacher and the average 
quality of teachers at the receiving school.  Schools whose average teacher quality is in the top 
quartile draw many more top-quartile teachers (32.38 percent) than to schools where average 
teacher quality is in the bottom quartile (23.17 percent).  Similarly, bottom-quartile schools are 
disproportionally attracting bottom-quartile teachers (28.52 percent) compared to top quartile 
schools (24.37 percent). 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
It has been well established that teacher quality is an important determinant of student 
achievement and that the observable credentials of teachers in schools teaching disadvantaged 
students are substantially below those of faculty in schools serving more advantaged students.  It 
is also well known that teacher mobility and attrition are significant, particularly among 
relatively new teachers.  However, there is currently a lack of evidence directly linking teacher 
mobility and the distribution of teacher quality across schools. 
In this paper we provide new evidence on the impact of teacher quality on teacher job 
change and on the distribution of teacher quality across schools.  We find that the most effective 
teachers are more likely to stay put rather than move to another school in the same district. In the 
case of exit, we uncover a bimodal quality distribution.  The most effective teachers are more 
likely to exit than middling quality teachers, but teachers at the low end of the quality 
distribution are also more likely to leave. Additionally, we find the fit between teacher own 
quality and peer faculty quality is important. Holding own quality constant, teachers whose peers 
are more effective tend to move around to find a better fit.  In particular, school quality rank 
plays a significant role in intra-district mobility. We also find evidence of human capital 
spillovers. Peers with job-specific teaching experience, professional certification, and advanced 
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degree will help school stem the trend of intra-district mobility. These peers may provide school 
specific job skills and knowledge to their colleagues, resulting in lower turnover.  
Further, teachers generally move to better schools with higher achieving students and 
with smaller shares of poor and minority students.  Teachers who move tend to go to a school 
where the average teacher quality is like their own.  The fraction of top quartile movers hired by 
schools whose faculty is in the top quartile of the quality distribution is much higher than that of 
schools whose faculty is in the bottom quartile of the quality distribution.  The net result is that 
the “rich get richer” and the movement of teachers across schools tends to exacerbate differences 
in teacher quality. 
Given the strong link between teacher quality and student performance, our results 
suggest that teacher mobility tends to increase the achievement gaps between white and minority 
students and between poor and more affluent students.  This suggests that mechanisms that 
reduce the natural flow of teachers to schools with superior faculties could help reduce student 
achievement gaps.  In particular, salary differentials for teachers willing to re-locate to schools 
serving disadvantaged students might be a worthwhile policy.  However, for differential salary 
schemes to alter the distribution of teacher quality, any monetary inducements must be tied to 
teacher quality. 
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Table 1.  Correlations of Teacher Quality Indicators in Math and Reading 
Q1-Math Q2-Math Q3-Math Q4-Math Q5-Math Q6-Math 
Q1-
Reading 
Q2-
Reading 
Q3-
Reading 
Q4-
Reading 
Q5-
Reading 
Q6-
Reading 
Q1-Math 1.00 
Q2-Math 0.80 1.00 
Q3-Math 0.72 0.57 1.00 
Q4-Math 0.71 0.59 0.51 1.00 
Q5-Math 0.57 0.74 0.42 0.80 1.00 
Q6-Math 0.57 0.47 0.63 0.81 0.65 1.00 
Q1-Reading 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.19 0.18 1.00 
Q2-Reading 0.23 0.43 0.16 0.20 0.37 0.17 0.80 1.00 
Q3-Reading 0.16 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.66 0.51 1.00 
Q4-Reading 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.69 0.56 0.46 1.00 
Q5-Reading 0.20 0.35 0.16 0.27 0.49 0.25 0.54 0.74 0.35 0.78 1.00 
Q6-Reading 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.53 0.41 0.61 0.77 0.58 1.00 
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Table 2. Average Teacher Quality in Math and Reading for Stayers, Intra-, Inter-district Movers, and 
Leavers 
  
Stay 
T-test (stay 
vs. move or 
exit) 
Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public 
schools Total 
Q1-Math 
0.0075 
6.88 
-0.0095 -0.0236 -0.0063 0.005 
(0.279) (0.280) (0.314) (0.279) (0.280) 
Q2-Math 
0.0008 
7.44 
-0.0066 -0.0279 -0.0098 -0.0007 
(0.287) (0.286) (0.310) (0.287) (0.288) 
Q3-Math 
0.0086 
5.90 
-0.0233 -0.023 -0.0117 0.0047 
(0.484) (0.450) (0.457) (0.474) (0.481) 
Q4-Math 
0.0187 
5.11 
0.0086 -0.0091 0.0146 0.0173 
(0.206) (0.226) (0.262) (0.245) (0.211) 
Q5-Math 
0.0254 
11.51 
0.0091 -0.0113 0.013 0.023 
(0.212) (0.229) (0.251) (0.243) (0.216) 
Q6-Math 
0.0219 
7.75 
-0.0066 -0.0132 0.0051 0.0185 
(0.302) (0.328) (0.342) (0.346) (0.307) 
Q1-Reading 
0.0051 
6.90 
-0.0197 -0.0229 -0.0067 0.0023 
(0.256) (0.263) (0.286) (0.250) (0.256) 
Q2-Reading 
-0.0024 
8.62 
-0.0269 -0.0332 -0.0158 -0.0053 
(0.259) (0.267) (0.282) (0.254) (0.259) 
Q3-Reading 
0.0077 
4.26 
-0.0257 -0.0164 -0.006 0.0042 
(0.516) (0.486) (0.508) (0.478) (0.512) 
Q4-Reading 
0.0113 
4.84 
-0.0038 -0.0121 0.0073 0.0097 
(0.182) (0.210) (0.237) (0.211) (0.187) 
Q5-Reading 
0.0175 
10.77 
-0.0071 -0.0168 0.0036 0.0145 
(0.195) (0.222) (0.240) (0.220) (0.199) 
Q6-Reading 
0.0147 
6.68 
-0.0147 -0.0128 -0.0025 0.0113 
(0.297) (0.337) (0.352) (0.332) (0.303) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 Multinomial Logit Hazard Estimates of the Relationship Between Teacher Quality in Math and Reading and the Odds of 
Teacher Mobility 
Math Reading 
  Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public schools Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public schools 
Q1 0.916 0.881 0.841** 0.801*** 1.040 0.819*** 
  (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.06) 
Q2 0.991 0.744** 0.851** 0.887 0.927 0.863** 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.06) 
Q3  0.896*** 0.951 0.931* 0.929** 1.118 0.970 
  (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) 
Q4 0.865 0.795 0.885 0.813** 1.029 0.793** 
  (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08) (0.22) (0.09) 
Q5 0.998 0.720* 0.862 0.989 1.034 0.833 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.24) (0.10) 
Q6 0.807*** 0.941 0.837** 0.863** 0.973 0.851** 
  (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) 
Note: Each row under the appropriate subject heading represents a separate regression.  Reported numbers are the odds ratios.  Robust 
standard errors for the underlying coefficients clustered at the school level are in parentheses.  Explanatory variables included teacher's 
age, age squared, female, female and age interaction term, teacher's race, teacher's education level, professional certification, reading 
certification, middle school math certification, high school math certification, indicator variables for special education teachers, middle 
school education teachers, high school teachers, English teacher, math or science teachers, self-contained class teachers, social studies 
teachers, indicator variable for regular and full time teachers, teacher's experience and experience squared term, dummy variables 
indicating the cohort year, and teacher's own salaries, and classroom, school, and district characteristics such as class size, average math 
score on the FCAT, disciplinary incidents, percent of minority students (Black, Hispanic), percent of students on free or reduced lunch 
program, indicator variables for the school grade in 1999 and log(years of teaching).  ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.10 
25 
 
Table 4  Multinomial Logit Hazard Estimates of the Relationship Between Different Quartiles of Teacher Quality in Math and the Odds of Teacher Mobility 
 
    Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public 
schools 
      Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public schools 
Q1-Math 
2nd quartile  
1.032 1.079 0.956 
Q4-Math 
2nd quartile 
0.926 0.981 0.705*** 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) 
3rd quartile  
1.002 1.049 0.918* 
3rd quartile 
0.931 0.991 0.751*** 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) 
4th quartile  
0.920 0.842* 0.854*** 
4th quartile 
0.960 0.857 0.965 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) 
Q2-Math 
2nd quartile  
0.957 0.936 0.944 
Q5-Math 
2nd quartile 
0.955 0.914 0.799*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) 
3rd quartile  
1.049 0.896 0.943 
3rd quartile 
1.012 0.918 0.851*** 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) 
4th quartile  
0.982 0.784** 0.896* 
4th quartile 
1.097 0.821 0.982 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) 
Q3-Math 
2nd quartile  
0.994 1.055 0.911* 
Q6-Math 
2nd quartile 
0.888** 0.968 0.685*** 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.03) 
3rd quartile  
0.997 1.115 0.958 
3rd quartile 
0.877** 0.957 0.740*** 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) 
4th quartile  
0.864*** 1.068 0.889** 
4th quartile 
0.857*** 0.983 0.920* 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) 
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Table 4  Continued 
 
    Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public 
schools 
     Intra-district 
move 
Inter-district 
move 
Exit FL public 
schools 
Q1-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
0.947 0.853 0.934 
Q4-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
0.857*** 0.820* 0.672*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) 
3rd 
quartiles  
0.866*** 0.925 0.950 3rd 
quartiles  
0.803*** 0.839 0.735*** 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) 
4th 
quartiles  
0.863*** 0.975 0.842*** 4th 
quartiles  
0.901** 1.012 0.860*** 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
Q2-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
1.018 0.932 1.059 
Q5-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
0.930 0.960 0.812*** 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) 
3rd 
quartiles  
0.990 1.028 0.911* 3rd 
quartiles  
0.951 1.029 0.780*** 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) 
4th 
quartiles  
0.896** 0.885 0.925 4th 
quartiles  
1.005 0.996 0.974 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) 
Q3-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
0.980 0.768** 0.953 
Q6-
Reading 
2nd 
quartiles  
0.835*** 0.820* 0.678*** 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) 
3rd 
quartiles  
0.949 1.020 0.947 3rd 
quartiles  
0.811*** 0.714*** 0.682*** 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) 
4th 
quartiles  
0.873*** 1.054 0.915* 4th 
quartiles  
0.861*** 0.952 0.850*** 
-0.05 -0.11 -0.05 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) 
Note: Each of the six math teacher quality indicator represents separate regression results. For example, first six rows presents one set of results from one multinomial logit hazard regression. 
Reported numbers are the odds ratios. Robust standard errors clustered at school level are in parentheses. Explanatory variables include teacher’s age, age squared, female, female and age 
interaction term, teachers’ race, teacher’s education level, professional certification, reading certification, middle school math certification, high school math certification, indicator variables 
for special education teachers, middle school education teachers, high school teachers, English teacher, math or science teachers, self-contained class teachers, social studies teachers, indicator 
variable for regular and full time teachers, teacher’s experience and experience squared term, dummy variables indicating the cohort year, and teachers’ own salaries, and classroom, school, 
and district characteristics such as class size, average math score on the FCAT, disciplinary incidents, percent of minority students (Black, Hispanic),  percent of students on free or reduced 
lunch program, indicator variables for the school grade in 1999, and log(years of teaching).  ***P<0.01 **P<0.05 *P<0.10 
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Table 5  Job match: Multinomial Logit Hazard Estimates of the Effects of Teacher Quality, Quality Rank, Peer Teacher Quality, and Peer Teacher Characteristics on the Odds of Teacher Mobility 
(Measure Six of Teacher Quality in Math Results) 
 
  
Model 1:  Peer teacher quality Model 2:  Peer teacher quality in quartiles 
Model 3:  Teacher quality school 
rank 
Model 4:  Peer teacher 
characteristics 
Model 5:  Peer teacher quality 
quartiles, quality rank, and peer 
teacher characteristics 
  Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Teacher Quality(Math) 
0.890** 0.968 0.686*** 0.885** 0.973 0.683*** 0.828*** 0.992 0.670*** 0.896** 0.962 0.684*** 0.827*** 0.974 0.663*** 
2nd  quartiles  
(0.045) (0.097) (0.035) (0.045) (0.098) (0.035) (0.044) (0.105) (0.036) (0.046) (0.096) (0.035) (0.045) (0.105) (0.036) 
3rd quartiles  
0.879** 0.945 0.744*** 0.873** 0.949 0.737*** 0.769*** 0.998 0.709*** 0.889** 0.951 0.737*** 0.763*** 0.952 0.694*** 
(0.047) (0.095) (0.038) (0.047) (0.096) (0.038) (0.049) (0.114) (0.041) (0.048) (0.095) (0.037) (0.050) (0.116) (0.042) 
4th  quartiles  
0.856*** 0.956 0.924 0.853*** 0.965 0.919* 0.710*** 1.039 0.866** 0.870*** 0.977 0.920* 0.698*** 0.969 0.846** 
(0.045) (0.098) (0.047) (0.045) (0.099) (0.046) (0.052) (0.136) (0.057) (0.046) (0.097) (0.046) (0.054) (0.142) (0.060) 
Peer math quality 
0.961 1.641** 0.913                         
(0.151) (0.413) (0.130)                         
Peer math quality 
      1.164** 0.951 1.050             1.199*** 0.96 1.066 
2nd quartile 
      (0.071) (0.094) (0.055)             (0.073) (0.096) (0.056) 
3rd quartiles  
      1.093 1.091 1.106*             1.162** 1.095 1.132** 
      (0.068) (0.112) (0.057)             (0.073) (0.115) (0.061) 
4th  quartiles  
      1.004 1.124 0.980             1.117* 1.119 1.015 
      (0.063) (0.117) (0.054)             (0.075) (0.126) (0.059) 
Teacher quality rank 
            1.028*** 0.992 1.009       1.029*** 0.999 1.012 
            (0.008) (0.013) (0.007)       (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) 
Number of faculty on campus 
            1.002 0.996* 1.000       1.003* 0.995** 1.000 
            (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)       (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of observations 59771 59771 59952 59952 59771 
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Table 5 Continued 
 
  
Model 1:  Peer teacher quality Model 2:  Peer teacher quality in 
quartiles 
Model 3:  Teacher quality school 
rank 
Model 4:  Peer teacher 
characteristics 
Model 5:  Peer teacher quality 
quartiles, quality rank, and peer 
teacher characteristics 
  Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Intra-
district 
move 
Inter-
district 
move 
Exit FL 
public 
schools 
Peer percent of masters 
degree holder 
                  0.560*** 0.868 1.570*** 0.557*** 0.904 1.587*** 
                  (0.104) (0.255) (0.223) (0.104) (0.263) (0.228) 
Peer percent of national 
board certified 
                  1.012 1.016 1.028*** 1.024 1.001 1.029*** 
                  (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.015) (0.021) (0.011) 
Peer percent of 
professional certified 
                  0.363*** 0.48 0.275*** 0.363*** 0.429 0.271*** 
                  (0.125) (0.267) (0.089) (0.126) (0.236) (0.088) 
Peer percent of middle 
school math certified 
                  0.806 3.11 0.94 0.574 3.726 0.831 
                  (0.578) (3.734) (0.592) (0.422) (4.339) (0.528) 
Peer percent of high 
school math certified 
                  0.289 2.284 0.694 0.117* 6.613 0.673 
                  (0.320) (3.841) (0.642) (0.137) (11.199) (0.639) 
Peer percent of reading 
certified  
                  1.018 28.491** 2.104 0.932 24.224** 2.085 
                  (0.810) (38.228) (1.446) (0.762) (31.944) (1.439) 
Number of observations 59771 59771 59952 59952 59771 
Note: Reported numbers are the odds ratios. Robust standard errors clustered at school level are in parentheses. Explanatory variables include teacher’s age, age squared, female, female and age interaction term, teachers’ race, teacher’s 
education level, professional certification, reading certification, middle school math certification, high school math certification, indicator variables for special education teachers, middle school education teachers, high school teachers, 
English teacher, math or science teachers, self-contained class teachers, social studies teachers, indicator variable for regular and full time teachers, teacher’s experience and experience squared term, dummy variables indicating the cohort 
year, and teachers’ own salaries, and classroom, school, and district characteristics such as class size, average math score on the FCAT, disciplinary incidents, percent of minority students (Black, Hispanic),  percent of students on free or 
reduced lunch program, indicator variables for the school grade in 1999, and log(years of teaching).  ***P<0.01 **P<0.05 *P<0.10 
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Table 6  Comparison of Student and Faculty Characteristics at Origin and Destination School 
 
  
t-Statistic for 
Difference in Mean Destination School Origin School 
School average characteristics t-statistics Mean 
Standard 
Error Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Intra-district Movers 
Percent black students -13.49 0.247 0.003 0.300 0.004 
Percent free/reduced price lunch 
students -22.46 0.457 0.004 0.544 0.004 
Disciplinary incidents 2.73 0.398 0.008 0.372 0.009 
Math performance 11.76 303.457 0.363 298.671 0.351 
Math teacher quality (Q1) 1.04 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002 
Math teacher quality (Q2) 0.91 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.002 
Math teacher quality (Q3) 1.74 -0.004 0.003 -0.011 0.003 
Math teacher quality (Q4) 0.48 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.001 
Math teacher quality (Q5) 7.86 0.032 0.002 0.017 0.002 
Math teacher quality (Q6) 1.07 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002 
School Grade     9.95 2.780 0.017 2.580 0.017 
Inter-district Movers 
Percent black students -3.63 0.235 0.006 0.264 0.007 
Percent free/reduced price lunch 
students -6.44 0.443 0.007 0.500 0.007 
Disciplinary incidents 1.04 0.427 0.016 0.408 0.014 
Math performance 3.36 304.252 0.659 301.462 0.614 
Math teacher quality (Q1) 2.28 -0.001 0.004 -0.014 0.004 
Math teacher quality (Q2) 1.32 -0.004 0.005 -0.013 0.005 
Math teacher quality (Q3) 1.93 0.010 0.008 -0.010 0.006 
Math teacher quality (Q4) 1.72 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
Math teacher quality (Q5) 3.41 0.031 0.004 0.014 0.003 
Math teacher quality (Q6) 2.02 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.004 
School Grade     1.76 2.736 0.030 2.668 0.031 
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Table 7 Frequency and Percent Distribution of Entering Math Teacher Quality for Each Quartile of 
Average Receiving School Teacher Quality Using Math Teacher Quality Measure Six 
 
Teacher own quality (Q6-Math) Receiving School Average Teacher Quality (Q6-math) 
Total   1st quartile 2nd quartile third quartile fourth quartile 
1st quartile 508 429 410 434 1781 
  (28.52) (24.09) (23.02) (24.37) (100)
2nd quartile 327 384 360 334 1405 
  (23.27) (27.33) (25.62) (23.77) (100)
third quartile 286 350 354 348 1338 
  (21.38) (26.16) (26.46) (26.01) (100)
fourth quartile 342 317 339 478 1476 
  (23.17) (21.48) (22.97) (32.38) (100)
Total -1463 1480 1463 1594 6000 
  (24.38) (24.67) (24.38) (26.57) (100)
Observations 6000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
